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I.  Policy Laws and Their Characteristics  
A. What Are Policy Laws? 
Policy laws are laws which are enacted to implement policies of 
policy makers or policies which are directly executed and enforced as 
laws.  Strictly speaking, every piece of law in China is enacted at the 
sole discretion of its policy maker – the Communist Party of China 
(“CPC”) to implement CPC‟s policies.  However, at the whole spectrum 
of Chinese laws, policy laws, compared with the Contract Law, the 
General Principles of the Civil Law, the Civil Procedural Law, the 
Criminal Procedural Law as well as other universally accepted general 
and ordinary laws (hereinafter collectively referred to as “general laws”), 
are arbitrary, unpredictable and non-transparent in both making and 
enforcement.  Generally, there are two forms of policy laws: 
1. Policy-laws: 
Policy-laws are enacted by either congresses (central or regional) 
or administrative departments in the form of law to carry out the political 
policies set by CPC.  “In many legal systems, legislators often attempt 
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to achieve a policy through granting rights or imposing penalties, and 
legal analysis consists of the study of the system of rights set up by the 
law. But the notable feature of policy-laws is that they do not grant rights 
and are not justifiable by courts.  At most, they express values that are 
expected to inform judicial decision-making.”
1
  Therefore, the 
provisions of the laws are like political slogans.  People can hardly use 
the laws to assert their rights.  The most significant policy-law is the 
Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China (“Constitution”) or some 
provisions of the Constitution fall into the category of policy-law.  For 
example, “the state promotes the nationwide use of Putonghua.”
2
  “All 
state organs and functionaries must rely on the support of the people, 
keep in close touch with them, heed their opinions and suggestions, 
accept their supervision, and work hard to serve them.”
3
  
2. Law-policies 
Law-policies are not set in the form of law.  On the contrary, they 
are “…meetings, notices, instructions, and speeches that are given legal 
effectiveness because they emanate from authoritative government and 
Party bodies.”
4
  Some other forms are decisions, notes, decrees
5
 or 
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directions.
6
  The policies might be used as legal authorities to decide 
rights and/or duties (like civil laws), even life or death (like criminal laws) 
or speed up or retard enforcement of laws (like procedural laws).  
For example, after the December 1978 Meeting of the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of CPC, private 
economic elements such as individual industrial and commercial 
households (“individual households”) began to emerge.
7
  However, it 
was still outlawed to hire people for the purpose of preventing rekindling 
of exploitation system.
8
  The situation continued until 1981 when the 
promulgation of Several Decisions on Widely Opening Employment 
Resources, Activating Economy, and Solving Job Issues of Cities and 
Towns
9
 was made, by which individual households were permitted to 
employ only two assistants. Some special craftsmen could hire five 
apprentices.
10
  
However, the limit of seven employees (assistants plus five 
apprentices) was quickly broken through by some brave entrepreneurs 
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who needed more people to work with, and there came forward some so 
called super individual households which, by exceeding limitation of 
seven employees,
11
 were facing serious criminal prosecution.
12
  It is 
Deng Xiaoping who condoned them by a speech.
13
 
B. Characteristics of Policy Laws 
1. Policy Laws Are Made and Enforced in Response to the Calls 
of CPC or Its Leaders 
Deferral to the calls of CPC or its leaders is a kind of political task. 
Policy-laws are usually made and enforced to fulfill the tasks while 
law-policies directly executed and enforced by administrative agencies 
and judicial systems as laws.  The making of policy-laws usually peaks 
annually with the plenary session of the CPC‟s Central Committee and 
several work meetings which are jointly held by the Central Committee 
of CPC and the State Council on diversified subjects such as economy, 
finance, agriculture and so on.  Policy-laws (as well as general laws) are 
thus enacted to carry out the spirits of the conferences and meetings.  
                                                        
11
 See, supra note 7. 
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 Id. 
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 Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), Zai di san jie zhong yang gu wen wei yuan hui shang de jiang hua (《在第
三届中央顾问委员会上的讲话》), [The Speech at the Third Plenum of Central Consultant Committee], 
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speech at a meeting of Central Advisory Committee: “Sometime ago, that people-employing issue was 
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The making of law-policies is much more frequent than policy-laws 
because law-policies can be made by a single leader either in writing or 
orally. 
2. Policy Laws Are Ambiguous and Usually Incur Arbitrariness in 
Interpretation 
Whether or how policy laws are executed usually depends on 
authoritativeness of the underlying policies and the concerned policy 
makers behind.  Almost inevitably, provisions of rights and duties in 
policy laws are not clearly defined and provided.  Instead, they are full 
of slogan-styled languages.  For example, “the 1985 State Council rules 
on enlivening state-owned enterprises (the „Enterprise Rules‟) merely 
express some generalized wishes and policy goals, such as that 
enterprises should obtain good leadership, increase their ability to reform 
themselves, and take effective measures to cut costs and raise 
productivity…and it is unimaginable (at least at present) that anyone 
could go into a Chinese court with a claim that some right he had was 
violated by the improper implementation of these rules."
14
 
For another example of Chinese compulsory education, literarily, 
Chinese compulsory education exists in name only or “[w]ithin the future 
five years, China can execute free nine-year compulsory education.”
15
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Almost no children can go to school without money paid first although 
the concerned laws otherwise stipulate – “the state runs schools of 
various types, makes primary education compulsory and universal, 
develops secondary, vocational and higher education and promotes 
pre-school education.”
16
  “The state shall not charge tuition for students 
receiving compulsory education.”
17
  “The State Council and the local 
people's governments at various levels shall be responsible for raising 
funds for the operating expenses and capital construction investment 
needed for the implementation of compulsory education, and the funds 
must be fully guaranteed.”
18
  However, if anyone sues central and/or 
local governments for being denied of opportunities of compulsory 
education, probably no court would hear the case.  Besides political 
reasons, there are some technical difficulties in initiating the proceedings 
– the State does not charge tuition and it is schools (both public and 
private) that charge money which might not be necessarily called as 
tuition.  By the same token, it would not be more possible to sue because 
“funds for education are not fully guaranteed.”  What is more, the piece 
of policy law did not provide private cause of action. 
3. General Laws Usually Defer to Policy Laws in Interpretation 
                                                                                                                                                              
of Executing Free Nine-year Compulsory Education within Five Years],  available at 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2005/2005-03-13/26/549905.shtml (last visited March 20, 2005). 
16
 CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, art. 19. 
17
 Zhong hua ren min gong he guo yi wu jiao yu fa, 《中华人民共和国义务教育法》 [the Compulsory 
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and Execution 
In order to crack down organized crimes, serious violent crimes 
and serious theft crimes, the Opinion of the Supreme People‟s 
Prosecutorate on Prosecuting Organizations Actively Participating in 
“Severely Cracking down” Struggles and Streamlining Economic Market 
Orders
19
 was issued on April 7, 2001 for the purpose of “thoroughly 
learning and following the spirit of the speech of the leaders of the 
Central Committee.”
20
  Clause two of the opinion provides: “serious 
criminals shall be cracked down more severely within prescribed 
sentencing volume and more quickly within prescribed time limitation.
21
 
The legal guidelines of “more severely” and “more quickly” should be 
combined with “two basic” principles – as long as basic facts are clear 
and basic evidence is confirmative, arrests and prosecutions should be 
made quickly according to law.  Do not be entangled with minor details 
and nonessentials.” (emphasis added).
22
  This Opinion is in conflict with 
the Criminal Procedure Law of the People‟s Republic of China,
23
 which 
provides that: “In conducting criminal proceedings, the People's Courts, 
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the People's Procuratorates and the public security organs must rely on 
the masses, base themselves on facts and take law as the criterion”
24
 
rather than “basic facts.”  The Criminal Procedural Law also provides 
that: “In the decision of all cases, stress shall be laid on evidence…”
25
 
instead of “basic evidence.”  What is most important, what is the 
criterion to distinguish between the facts which are major and significant 
and “minor details and nonessentials?”  What if a minor detail and 
nonessential happens to conflict with a major and significant fact?  
Under this situation, shall a criminal be put into jail or even executed?
26
 
4. Policy Laws Are Imperial in Nature 
Policy laws reflect the adherence and fancy to the efficiency and 
fearsomeness of imperial decrees
27
 which were personally issued by 
emperors in feudalism dynasties.  As a matter of fact, people usually 
attach more importance to the decrees or directions of leaders than 
general laws or seek the decrees or directions to trump general laws or the 
other decrees or directions. Some dilemmas which could have not been 
resolved for a long time can be raveled out in a very short time or at least 
appear so. 
For example, for a long time it had been well known that 
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nationwide peasant workers in China were owed a lot of payments for 
odd jobs.  It is difficult for each single peasant to sue for only several 
hundred bucks because he may not know how to hire, or cannot afford 
hiring a lawyer, or does not have evidence because of not knowing how 
to secure evidence especially for oral contracts.  Collecting money 
might bring in threats and physical harms exerted by contractor-debtors 
without even being subject to any liabilities.
28
  Many stories of 
miserable peasant workers had been exposed frequently, however vainly 
until October 24, 2003 when Premier Wen Jiabao visited a peasant family 
on a field trip.
29
  During visiting, the peasant complained of the owning 
by a local contractor.  Premier Wen thus directed on the spot that the 
problem be resolved immediately.  Therefore, 2,240 yuan (about $270) 
which had been owed for one year was totally paid off around 11 pm that 
day.
30
  Thanks to the continuous directions of the General Secretary Hu 
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, a nationwide campaign was launched to 
deal with the problem.
31
  According to January 17, 2004 report of 
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Xiahua News Agency, within two months, the concerned departments and 
organizations were deployed by the Central Committee of CPC and the 
State Council to react promptly to clean up defaults.
32
  According to the 
preliminary statistics of January 17, 2004, what had been defaulted in the 
past several years as much as 21.5 billion yuan (about $2.59 billion) or 
68% of the total owing was paid.  The owing of 2003 was paid as much 
as 89%.
33
 
In order to “win the campaign,” all courts in China were mobilized 
urgently to collect the peasants‟ hard-earned money.
34
  For example, 
Hebei Provincial High Court issued an urgent notice requiring all levels 
of courts in Hebei Province to concentrate time and manpower to try 
cases of defaulting peasant workers.
35
 Before the Spring Festival of 2004, 
“each court shall promptly try the cases and promptly enforce the 
judgments as long as they are involved in defaulting peasant workers.”
36
  
Yes, everyone should applaud justice being done for those peasant 
workers.  However, it is natural for people to ask: what if Premier Wen 
had not visited the peasant family or the peasant had not been brave 
enough to make the complaint?  What if this peasant did not have 
                                                        
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Xue han qian . 
35
 Sun Yingming & Han Yuanheng , Sheng gao yuan: tuo qian min gong gong zi an yao kuai shen kuai 
ban ge ji fa yuan jiang pai chu gan rao cong su zhi xing, [Provincial High Court: Cases of Defaulting 
Remuneration to Peasant Workers Should Be Tried and Payment Enforced Promptly; Various Courts 
Shall Promptly Enforce Judgment by Eliminating Interference], SHIJIAZHUANG DAILY, April 6
th
, 2004, 
available at http://www.sjzdaily.com.cn/gzmg/20031210/GB/sjzrb%5E1447%5ER02Bc002.htm (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
36
 Id. 
 59 
legitimate claim against the debtor?  What will the results of similar 
cases be after the campaign is over?  Why did not the people‟s courts 
uphold justice before the decrees and directions being issued?  With 
policy laws getting upper hand of general laws, the dividing line between 
the administration, the judicial system and CPC was blurred once again.  
The President, Premier and the General Secretary of CPC functioned like 
judges while judges act like administrative officers. 
There are many reasons to explain why judges were too lazy to 
hear cases of miserable peasant workers, and “policy laws” should be one 
of the reasons.  Policy laws cripple functionality of judicial system and 
damage the spirits of the rule of law.  Policy laws manifest a status quo: 
in China, power is superior to law.  Let‟s assume it is Premier Wen who 
owes money to the peasant worker and refuses to pay off his debt.  It 
would not be difficult to imagine what the result will be.  Actually the 
situation was just relieved not completely resolved.  Peasant workers are 
still literally shedding blood for collection of what they are owed.
37
 
II. New Tendency in Policy Laws  
“Under Mao, policy alone as articulated and applied by CPC had 
directed and guided the entire Chinese Party-state, and legislation had 
been used only formalistically to declare policy.  It was imprecise, 
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 Lai, supra note 28. 
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exhortational, tentative, and subject to unlegislated revision.”
38
  After 
adoption of the Constitution in 1982, as Stanley Lubman argued that, 
“Reform has brought a fundamental new orientation toward governing 
China that has generally been followed”
39
 because the Constitution 
“recognized promulgated laws enacted by the legislative organs of the 
state as the appropriate vehicles both for defining and implementing 
policy rather than CPC policy directives, even though the implementation 
of legislation still depends on CPC policies and changes in them.”
40
  The 
observation is not exact.  Actually, policy laws are still rampant 
although taking on new characteristics. 
A. Policy Laws Become More Ideologically Neutral than 
Ideologically Inspired. 
During the Mao era, “ideology penetrated every aspect of life in 
society. In this period, major economic policies were ideologically 
inspired; in other words they were derived from and evaluated against, 
ideological fundamentals.  The Great Leap Forward, the People‟s 
Commune the pursuit of the higher degree of public ownership, 
self-reliance and „politics in command‟ in economic activities in the 
Cultural Revolution best characterized this orientation.”
41
  Policy-laws 
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as instruments to implement policies and law-policies having legal 
binding force as laws inevitably became a weather wane to test whether 
socialist east wind overpowered capitalist west wind or vice versa. 
With the adoption of the “Reform and Open Door” policy and the 
advent of private economic elements, because class struggles between 
capitalism and socialism were no longer regarded as primary social 
conflicts, CPC‟s policies become more pragmatic and are thus primarily 
focused on economic issues.  Therefore, there appeared a lot of 
economic policy laws.  
B. Ideological Rhetoric Remains Intact in Some Certain Areas 
Although most policy laws are ideologically neutral, 
socialism-capitalism mental wrestling still exists in the areas which are 
critical to the national welfare and the people‟s livelihood
42
 such as the 
banking industry (the State-owned banks per se).  “The government has 
stated on many occasions that it is not prepared to reform the banking 
system until the experiment of economic development has been 
completed”
43
 because “the fundamental tenet of socialist policy was too 
sacred to be sacrificed in the early days of the experiment.”
44
  The 
State-owned banks as well as other important state-owned enterprises are 
always placed at the top of the totem pole to be favored and pampered 
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with private enterprises and entrepreneurs disfavored and discriminated.  
For example, to implement the spirit of 1997 Central Financial 
Work Meeting of the Central Committee of CPC and the State Council, 
the People‟s Bank of China (“PBC”) issued the Guiding Opinion on 
Improving Financial Services in Support of National Economic 
Development
45
 on May 26, 1998 requesting all banks (including city 
banks, policy banks as well as other commercial banks) to increase 
extension of loans to agriculture, forestry and irrigation construction,
46
 
and actively support the development of middle and small-sized 
enterprises and promote reemployment.
47
  However, Clause 2 demanded 
“concentration of funds to guarantee most important tasks” which were 
to ensure development of the big and medium-sized State-owned 
enterprises via reform.
48
  Specifically, banks shall support textile, coal, 
oil, and petroleum industries and 512 key industrial enterprises to 
mitigate their loss and make them profitable (emphasis added).
49
 
Apparently, if funds are concentrated to support the State-owned factors, 
how could banks have more money to support agriculture, forestry, 
irrigation construction, middle and small-sized enterprise, which are 
usually private companies?  As a matter of fact, lack of loans has been 
                                                        
45
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being a critical issue to bottleneck the development of private sectors.
50
  
From 1991 to 1997, the investments of private entities amounted to 15% 
to 27% of the whole country‟s total investments while the loans they got 
were only 0.87% of the total loans extended by banks.
51
 
C. Policy Laws Become Difficult to Enter Well Defined Legal 
Realms 
After the 1982 Constitution was adopted, law-making became 
frequent and prompt.  The more general laws are made, the more legal 
relations are stipulated, the less areas policy laws could exert influence on.  
For example, on January 10, 2001, the former General Secretary of CPC 
Jang Zeming brought about the “rule of moral”
52
 as one of guiding lines 
to rule the country at National Conference of Publicity Ministers.
53
  
However, “rule of law”
54
 at least as a conception has been too well 
developed and leave little space for “rule of moral” to be pervasive.  
Therefore, “rule of moral” was not too much dwelled on let alone put into 
the Constitution as a piece of policy-law.  
However, another theory “Three Representatives”
55
 raised by Jang 
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Zeming encountered less difficulty to get popularized than “rule of 
moral”, and ended into the Constitution as a guiding theory juxtaposed 
with the Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory.
56
  A search 
of “San ge dai biao”
57
 within the law database of the Supreme People‟s 
Court
58
 indicated that 561 items (including general laws, regulations, 
policy laws and judicial interpretations) mentioned “Three 
Representatives.”  However, within the same database, only 14 items, 
which are all policy laws, refer to “rule of moral”.  One of the most 
important reasons to explain the big difference is that “Three 
Representatives” is metaphysical and not in conflict with those 
well-developed legal conceptions and definitions.  Therefore, policy 
laws become difficult to play a role of substantive laws because they can 
hardly re-stipulate retrospectively the rights and duties which have been 
well defined by general laws.  On the contrary, policy laws function 
more like procedural laws to affect enforcement of general laws.  
D. Makers of Policy laws Become Multilateral and Multilevel 
Policy laws come from the concerned policies, and the policies 
come from the “great mind or minds” of CPC.  However, when 
personality cult faded away, the making of a policy is less single-minded 
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(e.g., Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory).  “The passing 
of Deng Xiaoping from the scene, removing the one person still able to 
impose overall policy, will almost inevitably trigger a new level of 
struggle even within the various factions which support the dominant 
marketization program.”
59
 
Therefore, central and local leaders, due to different conflicting 
directions, orders, notes or speeches, usually make policy laws 
multilaterally and at multilevel, which usually incur policy law shopping.   
It is not strange for the opposite parties of a case to seek law policies 
from different leaders (in legislature, administration and/or judicial 
systems) to trump general laws and each other decrees and/or directions.  
It is not unusual that a finished case is overturned upside down just 
because the decree(s) and/or direction(s) or the leaders behind are so 
powerful (e.g., the chief justice of a court where the case is heard, the 
mayor of a city or governor of a province where the hearing court is 
located).  
E. More Policy Laws Are Made for Private Interest Rather than 
Public Interest 
“This unification in China between the realms of economy and 
politics is nowhere better illustrated than in the powerful role in 
„business‟ played by top government and party leaders, and especially by 
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their family members, who use their official positions for personal benefit.  
These are the very elements who have led the market reform drive, based 
on the combination – not the opposition – of state power and private 
investment, and it is they, more than any others, who have enriched 
themselves as a result of their own policies.”
60
 “Red-hat businessman”
61
 
and “prince party”
62
 are public secrets in China.  They leverage their 
special official status and/or connections to acquire special interests and 
privileges.  Almost all of the sons and daughters of former and current 
advanced leaders are well placed in governmental and/or business posts.  
It is also not a surprise to find a connection between the success of a 
legendary businessman and the support of a cadre(s).  Policy laws 
(law-policies per se) are thus hijacked for rent-seeking.  
III. Conclusions and Suggestions 
“Reliance on „policy laws‟ is undemocratic, disorderly and a source 
of instability; „policy laws‟ do not set precise limits on legal and illegal 
behavior nor define the legal consequences of failure to comply, and they 
are procedurally unclear.”
63
  “This criticism parallels western views that 
when Party policy takes precedence over law, law loses its rationality and 
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 67 
the need to be internally consistent and orderly, and reflects the use of law 
as a „mere instrument.‟”
64
  The reason why a policy can be enacted into 
law arbitrarily or enforced as law directly is that CPC and its 
administration as both the policy maker and law maker are not checked 
and balanced.  It does not need for CPC or its administration to go 
through any vetogates
65
 before a policy becomes a law because there are 
no vetogates.  By the same token, policy laws do not have any tiny 
chances to be scrutinized by judicial reviews because the Chief Justice 
and the Chief Prosecutor are subject to the leadership of CPC and can be 
removed freely from their posts. 
How to deal with the problem?  A natural response would be to 
end the CPC‟s one-party ruling, which however is not a good remedy. 
Policy laws in China are imperial or of feudalism fundamentally.  Any 
political parties nurtured in such a feudalism context would naturally 
follow suit – they would not be less frustrated by not having final say on 
every policy making or would be as similarly perplexed by vetogates as 
CPC vis-à-vis the Kuomingtan.
66
  The Soviet Russia‟s shock therapy 
seemed not successful in democratic construction either – reliance on the 
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 68 
iron hand to govern seems to become a natural choice for both the 
governor and the governed. 
It would be likely harmful to refuse taking any reforming measures 
under the pretext of “maintaining the internal consistency of its official 
economic ideology under the „umbrella‟ concept of „socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.‟”
67
 
To reform, there would be tons of proposals from different 
perspectives. However, no proposals would be constructive without 
taking into account Chinese reality or constructiveness should be 
measured against how realistic they are in promoting Chinese 
democracy.  For policy laws, it would be unrealistic to propose CPC to 
be immediately self-disciplined and eradicate policy laws completely.  
Policy laws are a reflection of feudalism in imperial concentration of 
powers.  Therefore, it would be difficult for those who either make 
suggestions or are suggested to design a road map without letting CPC 
initially get used to separation of powers.  
A.  Strengthen Legislatures from Professionalizing 
Congresspersons 
To professionalize congresspersons (in both central and local 
legislatures) is to let them capable of being independent both in mind and 
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life.  In China, all congresspersons are part-time politicians.
68
  As a 
matter of fact, to be a congressperson is regarded by some of them a 
political honor rather than a duty.
69
  A congressperson could be an 
actress, farmer, sanitary worker, teacher, soldier, or bus driver.  There is 
no qualification requirement for education let alone legal education and 
training. Some of them do not understand some basic terminologies like 
GDP.
70
  “Lack of time for congresspersons to research bills … makes 
legislatures function like rubber stamps.”
71
  Such a legislature would be 
easy to pass any bills without any hesitation or could not check any 
policy laws within perimeters of rule of law.  Within 56 years from 1949 
to 2005, probably not even one bill was ever voted down by the National 
People‟s Congress (“NPC”) as well as the regional people‟s congresses.  
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It seems natural for CPC as well as its administration not to draw on the 
collective wisdom which might be experienced through a vetogate 
because there is hardly any wisdom to draw on.  
To professionalize legislatures also means that people who work in 
administrative agencies and judicial systems can not be elected as 
congresspersons any more as they are.  Actually, all of the advanced 
leaders in both administration and judicial systems (e.g., the President, 
the Premier, the Chief Justice and the Chief Prosecutor) are all 
congresspersons.  In the Tenth NPC, cadres
72
 amount to 32.44% of NPC 
representatives,
73
 which certainly incur a conflict of interest between 
three branches of government – judges, prosecutors and administrative 
officers make laws for them to execute and enforce, and vote for (or vote 
on at least) their own work reports. 
B. Strengthen the Judicial System from Making It Equal with 
Administrative and Legislative Powers 
Because the President,
74
 the Chairman of the Standing Committee 
of NPC,
75
 the Chief Justice,
76
 the Chief Prosecutor
77
 are all elected by 
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NPC,
78
 theoretically they should have the same footing in execution of 
powers. However this is not the case in reality.   
Actually, in CPC system, cadres are placed in the hierarchy of 
power pyramid.  From the top down to the bottom, it is ranked as the 
General Secretary, the Standing Committee of Political Bureau, the 
Political Bureau, the Central Committee, and the National Representative 
Conference of CPC.
79
  Customarily there is only one member assigned 
from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to lead the Standing 
Committee of NPC as its chairman, and one to preside over the Political 
Consultation Conference.
80
  The remainder is all concentrated in the 
administrative areas (e.g., the President, the Premier, the Commissioners 
of the State Council). 
The two highest judicial representatives (i.e., the Chief Justice and 
the Chief Prosecutor) are only at the level of the Central Committee,
81
 
which is lower in hierarchy than the Political Bureau, the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau and the General Secretary.  Thus, in 
CPC‟s cadre system, the Chief Justice and the Chief Prosecutor are 
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subordinate to not only the President (which is in administration), the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of NPC (in legislature), but also the 
Premier, the Deputy Premiers, and even Commissioners of the State 
Council (all in administration).
82
  
As a matter of fact, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau 
and/or the General Secretary decides the nominations of the candidates 
for Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor.  In addition, the Central Political 
and Legal Work Committee of the Central Committee is responsible for 
coordinating works among the Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Prosecutorate, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Justice. 
Its head is usually the member of the Standing Committee of the Political 
Bureau, who usually functions more than a coordinator. Local 
governments have the same design. 
“Judicial independence is normally thought of as independence 
from political control of the judicial process, but it would be more 
accurate to describe it as independence from control by superior officials, 
whether or not political, to the end of diffusing judicial power.”
83
  It is 
almost impossible for the judges and prosecutors to be truly independent 
with so many administrative and legislative bosses hanging above.  As 
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far as policy laws are concerned, what a court can do is just to follow let 
alone to conduct judicial reviews.   
Therefore, my proposal is to let two members of the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureaus to assume the posts of the Chief 
Justice and the Chief Prosecutor respectively so that the two heads of the 
judicial system might be equal with the counterparts in legislature and 
administration. 
The two proposals about strengthening legislative and judicial 
sectors of course are not enough to root out policy laws, and far more 
enough to let democracy and rule of law have their day in China 
completely.  However, every long march begins from the first step.  
Separation of powers would be the first step to make, which might not be 
perfect but essential and realistic.  
 
